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    package handlers
    
    import (
    	"net/http"
    	"regexp"
    	"strings"
    )
    
    var (
    	// De-facto standard header keys.
    	xForwardedFor    = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-For")
    	xForwardedHost   = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-Host")
    	xForwardedProto  = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-Proto")
    	xForwardedScheme = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Forwarded-Scheme")
    	xRealIP          = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("X-Real-IP")
    )
    
    var (
    	// RFC7239 defines a new "Forwarded: " header designed to replace the
    	// existing use of X-Forwarded-* headers.
    	// e.g. Forwarded: for=192.0.2.60;proto=https;by=203.0.113.43
    	forwarded = http.CanonicalHeaderKey("Forwarded")
    	// Allows for a sub-match of the first value after 'for=' to the next
    	// comma, semi-colon or space. The match is case-insensitive.
    	forRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:for=)([^(;|,| )]+)`)
    	// Allows for a sub-match for the first instance of scheme (http|https)
    	// prefixed by 'proto='. The match is case-insensitive.
    	protoRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:proto=)(https|http)`)
    )
    
    // ProxyHeaders inspects common reverse proxy headers and sets the corresponding
    // fields in the HTTP request struct. These are X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP
    // for the remote (client) IP address, X-Forwarded-Proto or X-Forwarded-Scheme
    // for the scheme (http|https) and the RFC7239 Forwarded header, which may
    // include both client IPs and schemes.
    //
    // NOTE: This middleware should only be used when behind a reverse
    // proxy like nginx, HAProxy or Apache. Reverse proxies that don't (or are
    // configured not to) strip these headers from client requests, or where these
    // headers are accepted "as is" from a remote client (e.g. when Go is not behind
    // a proxy), can manifest as a vulnerability if your application uses these
    // headers for validating the 'trustworthiness' of a request.
    func ProxyHeaders(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
    	fn := func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    		// Set the remote IP with the value passed from the proxy.
    		if fwd := getIP(r); fwd != "" {
    			r.RemoteAddr = fwd
    		}
    
    		// Set the scheme (proto) with the value passed from the proxy.
    		if scheme := getScheme(r); scheme != "" {
    			r.URL.Scheme = scheme
    		}
    		// Set the host with the value passed by the proxy
    		if r.Header.Get(xForwardedHost) != "" {
    			r.Host = r.Header.Get(xForwardedHost)
    		}
    		// Call the next handler in the chain.
    		h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
    	}
    
    	return http.HandlerFunc(fn)
    }
    
    // getIP retrieves the IP from the X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP and RFC7239
    // Forwarded headers (in that order).
    func getIP(r *http.Request) string {
    	var addr string
    
    	if fwd := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); fwd != "" {
    		// Only grab the first (client) address. Note that '192.168.0.1,
    		// 10.1.1.1' is a valid key for X-Forwarded-For where addresses after
    		// the first may represent forwarding proxies earlier in the chain.
    		s := strings.Index(fwd, ", ")
    		if s == -1 {
    			s = len(fwd)
    		}
    		addr = fwd[:s]
    	} else if fwd := r.Header.Get(xRealIP); fwd != "" {
    		// X-Real-IP should only contain one IP address (the client making the
    		// request).
    		addr = fwd
    	} else if fwd := r.Header.Get(forwarded); fwd != "" {
    		// match should contain at least two elements if the protocol was
    		// specified in the Forwarded header. The first element will always be
    		// the 'for=' capture, which we ignore. In the case of multiple IP
    		// addresses (for=8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4,172.16.1.20 is valid) we only
    		// extract the first, which should be the client IP.
    		if match := forRegex.FindStringSubmatch(fwd); len(match) > 1 {
    			// IPv6 addresses in Forwarded headers are quoted-strings. We strip
    			// these quotes.
    			addr = strings.Trim(match[1], `"`)
    		}
    	}
    
    	return addr
    }
    
    // getScheme retrieves the scheme from the X-Forwarded-Proto and RFC7239
    // Forwarded headers (in that order).
    func getScheme(r *http.Request) string {
    	var scheme string
    
    	// Retrieve the scheme from X-Forwarded-Proto.
    	if proto := r.Header.Get(xForwardedProto); proto != "" {
    		scheme = strings.ToLower(proto)
    	} else if proto = r.Header.Get(xForwardedScheme); proto != "" {
    		scheme = strings.ToLower(proto)
    	} else if proto = r.Header.Get(forwarded); proto != "" {
    		// match should contain at least two elements if the protocol was
    		// specified in the Forwarded header. The first element will always be
    		// the 'proto=' capture, which we ignore. In the case of multiple proto
    		// parameters (invalid) we only extract the first.
    		if match := protoRegex.FindStringSubmatch(proto); len(match) > 1 {
    			scheme = strings.ToLower(match[1])
    		}
    	}
    
    	return scheme
    }